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APPLICATION OF A HUMAN ERROR TAXONOMY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL ERRORS AND CAUSAL FACTORS
Katherine Berry and Michael Sawyer
TASC, Inc.
Washington, DC USA
With the complexity of the National Airspace System, a comprehensive taxonomy is needed to
classify incident causal factors within the air traffic control (ATC) industry. These causal factors
must not be limited to the individual involved in the incident, but must extend to the role of
management and the organization. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) is a human error taxonomy when integrated into the incident investigation process
permits for causal factors to be classified at various system levels. Utilizing HFACS, this study
investigates human performance within the ATC industry and classifies ATC incidents cases using
HFACS, investigates the effects of on-the-job training, and further examines the causal factor
networks present. These findings can be utilized to better understand the system-wide impacts on
ATC incidents and assist in targeting mitigations towards latent conditions, which have the
potential for a greater impact.
The Federal Aviation Administration is currently engaged in an effort to modernize the National Airspace
System. While the stated goals of the modernization includes increasing safety, the magnitude and nature of the
proposed changes create the opportunity for the introduction of a variety of new active and latent error modes not
present in the current system (Zemrowski & Sawyer, 2010). The ability to identify errors relevant to controllers is
essential to the safety of the National Airspace System. An integrated taxonomy is needed to ensure that these error
modes and their casual factors can be identified to allow for detailed analysis. Such a taxonomy would allow an
analyst to make comparisons between different sets of conditions in order to determine the different types of causal
factors present. For example, the presence of on-the-job training could affect the types and causes of errors
occurring in ATC incidents, and an integrated error taxonomy would allow an analyst to identify the specific issues
present during on-the-job training.
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Arising from a need for a common accident investigation taxonomy, the HFACS taxonomy was modeled
on Reason’s (1990) Swiss cheese model of active and latent conditions (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Initially
designed for aviation and in particular, the flight deck environment, the HFACS taxonomy (Figure 1) consists of one
tier of active errors – unsafe acts – and three tiers of latent conditions – preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
supervision, and organizational influence. The taxonomy provides a methodological approach for investigating both
accidents and near miss incidents (for more information, see Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Due to its origins, the HFACS taxonomy has been applied to the many facets of the aviation industry,
including commercial (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), military (Li & Harris, 2006), and general aviation (Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2004). Additionally, the application of the taxonomy has extended beyond the aviation industry to
include maintenance (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2010), mining (Patterson, 2009), and rail (Baysari et al.,
2008). The HFACS taxonomy was also retrospectively applied to the ATC industry to assess operational errors
attributed to controllers (Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005).The sub-section of the operation error form
detailing controller actions was mapped to HFACS causal categories. Since the portion of the operational error form
being analyzed only examined the acts of the controller, only HFACS causal categories at the unsafe acts tier – skillbased errors and decision errors – were identified. It should come as no surprise that as the ATC operational errors
mapped only to HFACS errors the study lacked the necessary detail to fully examine human performance.
Therefore, the present study presents a more robust examination of ATC human performance by extending beyond
the unsafe acts tier to examine latent failures throughout the entirety of the HFACS taxonomy.
Causal Factor Associations
Typically, errors violations are not random events, but can be attributed to a combination of causes and
contributing factors (Senders & Moray, 1991). The combination of causes interact in unique and varying ways
allowing for Reason (1990) to establish the existence of interactions between active error and latent conditions. It is
important to note that the identification of causal factors does not equate to the identification of a single, absolute

cause, but rather to the identification of causal chains or networks (Senders & Moray, 1991). The incident
investigator or safety manager should identify not only active errors, but should expand their investigation to
incorporate these causal networks. Doing so would permit for the ability to target interventions and even to predict
when and under what circumstances future accidents may occur (Alkov, 1997).
In an effort to extend beyond the traditional frequency-based analysis, many accident and incident
causation studies have investigated the associations and linkages between contributing factors and errors. A more
recent use of the HFACS taxonomy has been to explore error pathways, or the relationship among HFACS causal
factors. In aviation, linkages have been identified among the crew resource management category and both skillbased error and decision error causal categories have been established (Li & Harris, 2006; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008).
Similar pathways were also exhibited in a non-aviation analysis (Berry, Stringfellow, and Shappell, 2010).
Examining the associations among HFACS causal categories is still at the beginning stages of research and has yet
to be expanded to the ATC industry.

Figure 1. HFACS Taxonomy (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003)

Purpose
The purpose of this study is three-fold. First, the traditionally HFACS analysis will be expanded to the
ATC industry to identify HFACS causal categories. Unlike previous analyses, this study will not be limited to the
unsafe act tier, but will incorporate the HFACS taxonomy as a whole and will identify causal categories at all four
tiers. Second, the study examines the effects of on-the-job training in regards to incident data and causal factors.
Finally, this analysis will identify associations between active errors and latent conditions. Ideally, association
analyses would permit for the shifting targeted mitigation areas from active errors to latent conditions.
Methodology
This analysis utilized data from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database. Spanning
2007 through 2009, 1,324 ASRS cases that identified ATC as a factor were collected. The cases represented a

variety of controller types and positions. 35.60% of the cases involved ARTCC controllers, 35.91% of the cases
involved TRACON controllers, 27.86% of cases involved tower controllers, and 0.63% of cases involved the flight
service station. A causal factor analysis was then performed using the HFACS taxonomy. The ASRS cases were
classified using HFACS by one of two methods – independent coders or consensus (Berry, Stringfellow, and
Shappell, 2010). The first method involved multiple analysts and a quality assurance individual. At least two
analysts independently classified a case and if a disagreement existed, an additional analyst performed a quality
assurance check to solve the disagreement (Shappell, et al. 2007). A secondary method of consensus coding was
adapted for efficiency purposes. This method required multiple analysts to review a case and come to a consensus or
agreement on the causal factors contributing to the case. This technique does not require a quality assurance
individual to moderate the process.
Statistical Analysis
Each ASRS case was evaluated across all four HFACS tiers, and the presence or absence of each HFACS
causal factor was recorded. It is important to note that the HFACS categories are not mutually exclusive. For
example, an individual case can include a skill-based error, violation, and adverse mental state. For each HFACS
causal factor, the percentage of ATC cases containing at least one instance of the causal factor was calculated.
Additionally since ATC utilizes on-the-job training frequently, the effect of on-the-job training on HFACS causal
factors was examined. If on-the-job training was occurring during the time of the case, it was noted. Cross
tabulations of the various HFACS causal factors and the presence or absence of on-the-job training were created and
displayed in contingency tables. In order to estimate the statistical strength of the effects of on-the-job training, a
Pearson’s Chi-Square analysis for independence was performed and the impact of that effect was determined
utilizing a relative risk analysis. The relative risk value was assessed in a hypothesis test, where the null hypothesis
was the relative risk value is equal to one, which is considered to be neutral, and the alternative hypothesis was that
the value does not equal one (Sheskin, 2004).
The HFACS causal factor association analysis was conducted under the assumption that causal factors
within both adjacent and non-adjacent tiers may be associated. For example, associations among unsafe acts causal
factors were not limited to only the preconditions for unsafe acts causal factors, but were extended to both the unsafe
supervision and organizational influence causal factors as well (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2010). Cross
tabulations of HFACS causal factor pairings were created and displayed in contingency tables. A Pearson’s ChiSquare analysis for independence was performed. While the Pearson’s Chi-Square test determined the significance
of an association, the direction of the associations cannot be determined from the test. If a pair of causal factor was
found significant (p≤0.001), the odds ratio was calculated. Since the HFACS classification incorporates casual
factors at various levels, an asymmetrical measure of association strength is also necessary. In addition to odds ratio,
the relative risk was also calculated. Relative risk, in addition to be asymmetrical and directional, also has the
benefit of being more intuitive than odds ratios (Sheskin, 2004). Due to the asymmetrical nature, two different
relative risks were calculated – 1) relative risk of the higher tier given the lower tier occurs and 2) relative risk of the
lower tier given the higher tiers occurs. Finally, the odds ratio value and both relative risk values were assessed in
hypothesis test.
Results and Discussion
The results from the ATC HFACS causal factor analysis can be viewed in Table1. The percentages in
Table 1 do not add up to 100% since incidents typically are classified with more than one causal factor. The results
of the causal factor analysis can be interpreted as 43.49% of ATC cases had at least one occurrence of a skill-based
error causal factor. Many of the causal factors findings are similar to HFACS findings in other industries (Berry,
Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009). Of interesting note are those causal factors (skill-based error, decision error,
technological environment, adverse mental state, and crew resource management) with high percentage of cases
values. Many of the skill-based error cases can be attributed to communication errors, which occurred in 17.67% of
cases. Much of the ATC position involves communication with various actors and therefore, it is not a surprise that
the communication error causal factor is a main contributor. Many of the decision error cases can be attributed to
knowledge errors, which occurred in 17.07% of cases.
The ATC job involves varying software and technology, which explains technological environment being a
large contributor in the causal factor analysis. Many of the technological environment cases can be attributed to
checklist/procedure design (8.08% of cases) and communication equipment /tools (6.19% of cases). Additionally,
controllers are required to communicate, coordinate, and dynamically plan with other controllers, pilots, dispatchers,

and other actors explaining why crew resource management (CRM) is a main contributor to the causal factor
analysis.
Table 1. ATC HFACS Causal Factor Analysis – Percentage of Cases.
ATC
HFACS Causal Factor
(n=1324)
HFACS Causal Factor
Unsafe Acts
Unsafe Supervision
Skill-Based Error
43.96%
Inadequate Supervision
Decision Error
26.81%
Plan Inappropriate Operations
Perceptual Error
3.25%
Fail to Correct Problem
Violation
0.91%
Supervisory Violation
Precondition for Unsafe Act
Organizational Influences
Physical Environment
5.29%
Resource Management
Technological Environment
24.09%
Organizational Climate
Adverse Mental State
33.16%
Operational Process
Adverse Physiological State
1.51%
Physical/Mental Limitation
4.68%
Crew Resource Management
31.80%
Personal Readiness
1.06%

ATC
(n=1324)
6.65%
5.36%
6.80%
0.45%
3.17%
1.21%
6.12%

On-the-Job Training
In a similar manner to CRM, on-the-job training plays an important role in ATC. At the beginning stages of
their career as a developmental, controllers participate in on-the-job training to initially reach an acceptable level of
proficiency, and once that same controller becomes a certified professional controller (CPC), the controller will
mentor a developmental by administering on-the-job training. To assess its effects, the presence or absence of
training being conducted during the time of the incident was identified. As shown in Table 2, three HFACS causal
factors resulted in significant Chi-Square values (p≤0.001) and significant relative risk values (p≤0.01).The relative
risk values indicate that for ATC incident cases, the likelihood of a decision error occurring while training is being
conducted is 2.35 times higher than when training is not being conducted.
Table 2. HFACS Causal Category Relative Risk Values for On-the-Job Training
HFACS Causal Category
Relative Risk
Decision Error
2.35
Physical/Mental Limitation
9.23
Crew Resource Management
2.64

During many training ATC incidents, the CPC would partially transfer the responsibility to the
developmental by allowing the developmental to actively control traffic while the CPC monitors the traffic and the
developmental’s actions. In some instances, an operational error would occur when the developmental was actively
controlling traffic and the CPC failed to take over the position in a timely manner to prevent the operation error. The
CPC would acknowledge the poor choice (decision error), but identified the event as a learning experience for both
the developmental and the CPC. In other incidents, the developmental would be in a situation where his or her
current knowledge base did not have the necessary information to adequately perform in a unique situation
(physical/mental limitation – knowledge limitation). Also, since the developmental and CPC would be working as a
team controlling traffic, it is not surprising that crew resource management causal factors would be present.
HFACS Associations
The HFACS causal factor category association findings can be found in Table 3. Only those causal factor
pairings that were found significant from the Chi-Square analysis (p≤0.001) were reported. The relative risk of the
higher tier indicates that an ATC incident case with a decision error is 4.32 times more likely to have a
physical/mental limitation than an incident case that does not have a decision error. The relative risk of the lower tier
indicates that an ATC incident case with a resource management causal factor is 5.00 times more likely to have a
plan inappropriate operation causal factor. Many causal factor pairs were identified and reported a significant ChiSquare value (p≤0.001). Additionally, it should be noted that all association findings reported in Table 3 also have
an odds ratio that was determined to be statistically significant (p≤0.01) indicating a non-neutral odds ratio.
However, many relative risk values did not succeed in rejecting the null hypothesis. Most of the associations

incorporated either a precondition for unsafe act causal factor and/or an unsafe act causal factor, and this may be
attributed to the nature of these two tiers. The incident factors correlated with these lower HFACS tier causal factors
are more readily and easily identifiable than causal factors at the higher two tiers.
Table 3. ATC HFACS Associations Findings
Pearson's
Chi Square*

Relative Risk
Higher Tier
Value p-value

Relative Risk
Lower Tier
Value p-value

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

5.04
22.02
5.51
8.02
8.14
15.05
21.59
0.30

**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

2.24
40.70
5.00
6.19
6.29
14.43
22.30
0.34

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**

0.40
2.32
0.32
2.20

**
**
**
**

0.53
1.67
0.44
1.80

**
**

Odds Ratio
Value p-value

HFACS Causal Categories
HFACS Tier 4 - Organizational Influences
Resource Management X Adverse Mental State
28.67
5.34
Resource Management X Personal Readiness
134.18
50.04
Resource Management X Plan Inappropriate Operation
29.08
6.26
Organizational Climate X Plan Inappropriate Operation
21.39
8.55
Organizational Climate X Physical Environment
21.80
8.69
Organizational Climate X Adverse Physiological State
32.35
17.52
Organizational Climate X Personal Readiness
48.46
27.21
Operational Process X Technological Environment
11.26
0.28
HFACS Tier 3 - Unsafe Supervision
Inadequate Supervision X Skill-Based Error
15.45
0.38
Plan Inappropriate Operation X Adverse Mental State
14.04
2.45
Fail to Correct Problem X Skill-Based Error
22.50
0.30
Fail to Correct Problem X Technological Environment
15.29
2.36
HFACS Tier 2 - Precondition for Unsafe Act
Technological Environment X Skill-Based Error
62.84
0.33
Technological Environment X Decision Error
28.09
0.41
Adverse Mental State X Skill-Based Error
23.28
1.76
Physical/Mental Limitation X Skill-Based Error
15.98
0.29
Physical/Mental Limitation X Decision Error
39.40
4.72
Crew Resource Management X Skill-Based Error
17.38
0.60
Crew Resource Management X Decision Error
11.20
1.54
* indicates significant at alpha of 0.001

**
**
**
**
**
**
**

0.42
**
0.49
**
0.50
**
0.50
**
1.46
**
1.36
**
0.31
**
0.43
**
4.32
**
2.44
**
0.71
**
0.74
1.33
1.36
** indicates significant at alpha of 0.01

The skill-based error causal category produced in six significant association pairings. However, all but one
of the pairings resulted in either a non-significant relative risk value or a relative risk value less than one. This can
be attributed to the large number of occurrences of skill-based errors. As seen in Table 1, the skill-based error causal
category is the most widely reported and identified HFACS causal category for ATC incident cases and is therefore
associated with a plethora of causal categories. The only skill-based error pairing with a significant relative risk
values greater than one is that pairing with the adverse mental state causal category. Since the adverse mental state
causal category is the second most reported and identified HFACS causal category for ATC incidents, this pairing
should be taken into consideration and further examined. Of interesting note is the higher number of organizational
influence associations in comparison with previous findings (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2010; Li & Harris,
2006; Li, Harris, &Yu, 2008). In air traffic control, the organization or FAA is easily identified and its role and
responsibilities more clearly defined than other industries (e.g. general aviation). The organizational climate HFACS
casual category incorporates safety culture causal factors and could explain many of the associations with that
particular causal category. For example, if safety culture is a causal factor, a controller may not regard safety-related
personal readiness causal factors (e.g. adhering to rest requirements, reporting to duty in a manner fit to control
traffic) as important.
Seldom are incidents an outcome of one single event or unsafe act, but are culminations of various factors
including, but not limited to environmental, task-related, situational, and organizational factors. Since latent
conditions have the ability to remain passive in a system, the unpredictable combinations of latent conditions and
active errors result in continuing and more hazardous gaps (Reason, 1990). These findings can be utilized in
targeting interventions and mitigations for current operations and can help to guide safety considerations and
assessments for future operations. Also, interventions targeted towards latent conditions (organizational influence
tier, unsafe supervision tier, and preconditions for unsafe act tier) rather than active errors (unsafe acts tier) have the
potential to result in the greater gain and have the greater impact. Safety managers should take into consideration
both the ATC HFACS findings (Table 1) and the associations findings (Table 3) when determining areas for
improvement. Not only should the most frequency causal category mitigated, but the causal category associations
should be accounted for in interventions. For example, if a mitigation is targeted towards the resource management

causal category, the potential exists to impact not only the resource management causal category, but also the plan
inappropriate operations, personal readiness, and adverse mental state causal category.
Conclusion
In the present study, 1,324 ATC incident cases were collected and classified using the HFACS taxonomy.
The effects of on-the-job training were also examined, and three HFACS causal categories – decision error,
physical/mental limitation, and crew resource management – were found to be impacted by on-the-job training.
Associations between HFACS causal categories were reported, and significant causal factor pairings emerged from
data. Findings from the HFACS classification and the association findings should be utilized when determining
mitigations targeted towards latent conditions. Future work in this area should further examine the organizational
influences causal categories in more detail.
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